It is customary, at times like this, to mention 1966. Amid England’s repeated inability to replicate the scenes at Wembley six decades ago, however, it may be pertinent to note 1966 was the last World Cup before the introduction of substitutes. England’s defence of their title ended in 1970 after Sir Alf Ramsey’s decision to take Bobby Charlton off against West Germany. If nothing else, it is no longer the most infamous substitution an England manager has made in a World Cup in North America. When Ezri Konsa came for Anthony Gordon in Atlanta, it helped propel Argentina into the final.

Thomas Tuchel may note the only three previous managers to take England to a World Cup semi-final – Ramsey, Bobby Robson and Gareth Southgate – all ended up knighted. It is not only his German passport that suggests he need not save a date in his diary for a trip to Buckingham Palace.

The inquest into England’s latest exit can bring in several strands. Ranked fourth in the world, England reached the last four; viewed that way, it is about par. In the context of their history, it is overachievement. But the manner of England’s defeat to Argentina was damning, the 36-minute spell when they had 12 per cent of possession marking a regression. England’s imported managers can somehow end up more English than the English: Sven-Goran Eriksson and Fabio Capello were both wedded to 4-4-2, while Tuchel, though changing shape, seemed intent on recreating the Battle of Dunkirk, looking for heroic resistance on a small patch of land.

It worked against Mexico and Norway but not against Argentina. Over the tournament as a whole, however, there were some echoes of Euro 2024, when England progressed but not always convincingly. Their performance levels were rarely those of potential winners.

That is part of the case against Tuchel and his team. England played brilliantly in a 15-minute burst against Croatia, and an opening win was encouraging. Victory over Mexico in the Azteca was epic, first in scoring three goals and then in the rearguard action. But they were atrocious against Ghana, little better against Panama, dreadful in the first half against DR Congo, fortunate against Norway and deservedly defeated by Argentina.

Tuchel had talked of adding a “second star” to the England shirt. Too often, his team were second rate. What they often had, and what could be their salvation, was spirit: in a way, both Jude Bellingham and Tuchel were right in their immediate analysis of the victory over Norway, the manager finding fault with the display, the player highlighting the huge effort he and his teammates had produced over 120 minutes in the Miami heat.

Part of Tuchel’s strategy to win the World Cup consisted of having two world-class attackers. His tough-love treatment of Bellingham in autumn felt a success when the Real Madrid man delivered back-to-back braces against Mexico and Norway; his was one of the finest World Cups any England player has mustered since 1966. Harry Kane’s tour de force was his rescue act against DR Congo. Never before had two Englishmen struck six times in the same World Cup.

When neither was at his best against Argentina, it highlighted England’s reliance on them. Beyond them, a third player was consistently excellent: Elliot Anderson, one of the great benefits of Tuchel’s reign. A number of other England players could point to a game or two when they did particularly well. Anthony Gordon got twin assists against DR Congo and scored in a World Cup semi-final. Jordan Pickford was brilliant in Mexico. John Stones was terrific against Norway. Dan Burn had two iconic cameos. Djed Spence went from scapegoat to star: for 70 minutes, he was arguably the best player on the pitch against Argentina. The Tottenham full-back’s surprise success was vindication for Tuchel: how many others would even have picked him in the squad?

But England had neither a group who always impressed nor a formula. Sometimes, until Argentina, Tuchel got his changes right, but many a call could be questioned. Marc Guehi started the tournament on the bench. Stones vanished for the best part of three games. Kobbie Mainoo was there, but also not there.

And, while Tuchel wanted Premier League intensity and pace, a preference for the physical rather than the technical was apparent. Spence justified that theory. Others did not. Noni Madueke should not have been in the squad ahead of Cole Palmer – not when Morgan Rogers could also play on the right – or a host of others ahead of Trent Alexander-Arnold; Jarell Quansah’s red card in Mexico as a makeshift right-back ultimately did not cost England but if it had, Tuchel would have been to blame.

Tuchel may feel himself unfortunate that two of his supposed trump cards were hampered by injury and, in one case, illness. They saw less of Bukayo Saka and Declan Rice than they may have envisaged; perhaps Mikel Arteta’s tendency to overwork his premier players hurt England. But, like the right-back farrago, they highlighted faultlines in the squad.

England’s planning left much to be desired. Basing themselves in Kansas City, when they ended up with six games near the east coast and none on the west, amounted to another mistake.

And yet they could all have been camouflaged if Tuchel had replaced Gordon with Marcus Rashford – or Saka, and swapped Rogers to the left – and England had either scored a second goal against Argentina or at least posed enough of a threat to spare them waves of attacks. As their World Cup descended into a missed opportunity, it may leave this England with a unique place in their history. The teams who lost in the semi-finals in 1990 and 2018 realistically could not have done much more. This side could. And that should be their eternal regret.